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Abstract—Trust is arguably the most important challenge for
critical services both deployed as well as accessed remotely over
the network. These systems are exposed to a wide diversity of
threats, ranging from bugs to exploits, active attacks, rogue oper-
ators, or simply careless administrators. To protect such applic-
ations, one needs to guarantee that they are properly configured
and securely provisioned with the “secrets” (e.g., encryption
keys) necessary to preserve not only the confidentiality, integrity
and freshness of their data but also their code. Furthermore,
these secrets should not be kept under the control of a single
stakeholder—which might be compromised and would represent
a single point of failure—and they must be protected across
software versions in the sense that attackers cannot get access to
them via malicious updates. Traditional approaches for solving
these challenges often use ad hoc techniques and ultimately rely
on a hardware security module (HSM) as root of trust. We
propose a more powerful and generic approach to trust man-
agement that instead relies on trusted execution environments
(TEEs) and a set of stakeholders as root of trust. Our system,
PALÆMON, can operate as a managed service deployed in an
untrusted environment, i.e., one can delegate its operations to an
untrusted cloud provider with the guarantee that data will remain
confidential despite not trusting any individual human (even
with root access) nor system software. PALÆMON addresses in a
secure, efficient and cost-effective way five main challenges faced
when developing trusted networked applications and services.
Our evaluation on a range of benchmarks and real applications
shows that PALÆMON performs efficiently and can protect secrets
of services without any change to their source code.
I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting the confidentiality, integrity and freshness (CIF)
of application data is a key challenge of many applications, and
a primary reason for companies to be wary of deploying their
system outside premises in shared environments. To illustrate
the challenges faced in such scenarios, consider for instance
modern machine learning applications that require significant
computing power and would hence benefit from running in
a scalable cloud infrastructure. Yet, at the same time, they
need to protect their code, their training data (input) and the
produced model (output), all of which represent key assets
for their respective owners (see Fig. 1). The development and
operation of such a large system involve multiple stakeholders,
notably software developers, system administrators, data
providers and cloud providers, which cannot necessarily be
trusted and might collude to gain advantages over the other
stakeholders [54]. For example, we cannot trust that system
administrators or software developers will neither leak [63],
[24] nor modify application code and data. To address these
challenges and enable trusted application execution in the
face of Byzantine stakeholders, we have designed PALÆMON,
a trust management service that builds on top of the SCONE
platform [5] and ultimately relies on hardware-based trusted
execution environments (TEEs) for secure execution.
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Fig. 1: Components and stakeholders of the machine learning (ML)
use case. The training data and model belong to the data and model
providers, whereas the ML processing runtime is owned by the
software provider. These key assets must be protected at all times
from the other stakeholders.
PALÆMON was originally developed in order to address real
problems from some users and there was no alternative service
available to solve the problems we faced. It was extended
and refined over the course of the last two years to take into
account additional threats and support the evolution of trusted
applications via secure updates. We motivate its design and
illustrate its operation on a real-life production use case in
the machine learning space, yet our approach is more general
and applies to a much wider range of applications.
At the core of PALÆMON is a trust management service
specifically designed to address the following main challenges:
1) Secret management — How can we securely provide
applications with secrets in an untrusted environment?
2) Managed operation — How can we delegate the
management of PALÆMON to untrusted stakeholders?
3) Robust root of trust — How can we protect CIF against
malicious stakeholders?
4) Rollback protection — How can we ensure freshness of
data and code in an efficient manner?
5) Secure update — How can we support secure updates of
applications and PALÆMON?
To better understand the importance of these challenges,
let us illustrate them on one of the original use cases that
guided the design of PALÆMON. This real-life use case comes
from a company, a software provider specialized in ML that
develops its ML engine in Python (see Fig. 1). The engine
is executed by a second party, the model provider, which
processes training data to produce a model. The software
provider must neither learn the training data nor the produced
model. Conversely, the model provider must not learn the
application code of the software provider. Moreover, the
software provider may want to limit the number of models
produced by its application, and hence the number of times the
code is executed. The model provider might try to circumvent
this limitation by reverting the application to a previous state
in order to generate more models (“rollback attack”).
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In its initial deployment, the model provider ran the ML
engine on dedicated computers within its own air-gapped
infrastructure, over which it has complete control. Then, the
model provider wants to execute the application in a cloud
instead. Therefore, it also needs to protect its training data
and generated models from the third-party cloud provider,
including developers and system administrators. Finally, when
operating in the untrusted cloud, it should be possible for
the software provider as well as the provider of the Python
runtime to continuously update their software while preserving
the trust guarantees, i.e., one should prevent an attacker from
injecting malicious code during software updates.
This real-life application illustrates the need for addressing
the aforementioned set of problems: it requires secure secret
management to preserve confidentiality of the code and data,
managed operation to delegate the management to a cloud
provider, a robust root of trust to protect both data and
code, rollback protection to control the number of models
produced, and support for secure update for managing the
life cycle of software deployed in a third-party cloud. Our
general approach to address these five problems is to define a
novel trust management service (TMS) that supports security
policies and is able to deal with untrusted stakeholders. The
TMS can itself be managed by an untrusted entity (e.g., the
ML model provider) while still being trusted by other entities
(e.g., the ML software provider).
The contributions of this paper are as follows. While many
of the techniques that we use are known, combining these to
address the problems we face is novel. We are not aware of
any other service that transparently protects applications from
rollback attacks with little overheads, supports secure software
updates and guarantees CIF of data and code even in the
face of insider attacks, while still being able to delegate the
management of the service to remote providers. Throughput
of our monotonic counters is 5 orders of magnitude higher
than those provided by the SGX platform.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first
introduce the threat model and problem in §II. We then present
the architecture of PALÆMON in §III and its implementation in
§IV. We evaluate PALÆMON’s security and performance in §V,
present a real use case in production settings in §VI, discuss
related work in §VII and conclude in §VIII.
II. THREATS AND CHALLENGES
We first introduce our threat model before we describe in
greater details the challenges addressed by PALÆMON.
A. Threat Model
Services executing in untrusted environments such as clouds
are vulnerable to attackers with root privileges. Attackers
often target the credentials of system administrators to gain
access to hosts [75], [26], [22]. They also exploit bugs in the
system software to gain root privileges on systems [28], [19].
Multiple stakeholders of the same services cannot trust each
other to protect the CIF of their digital assets such as data and
code. Fig. 2 illustrates the security goals of PALÆMON with
regard to the stakeholders as well as the building blocks in our
system. For example, PALÆMON can protect CIF of Python code
deployed at remote sites, a somewhat surprising but popular
requirement for several applications of our users. Furthermore,
applications must be regularly updated, and we need to protect
them against malicious software updates triggered by attackers.
Note that we cannot trust any system administrator or soft-
ware developer—actually not any single individual. Hence, we
do not trust in CIF of main memory. We also do not assume that
the OS-based access control can ensure CIF since a single ma-
licious system administrator could break this assumption. It fol-
lows that one cannot trust software updates originating from a
single developer nor security policies defined by any individual,
independent of their authorization level or trustworthiness.
PALÆMON protects from attempts to compromise CIF of code
and data by requiring a quorum of trusted entities—not just a
single individual—to approve any given change. This is based
on the assumption that, in any organisation that must securely
operate an application, one can identify a set of n stakeholders
and a threshold f (with f<n), such that n−f stakeholders
can be trusted at any point in time, i.e., at most f of them
exhibit Byzantine behaviour because of neglect or malicious
intent. Hence, if at least f+1 stakeholders approve a change,
such as a software update, at least one of them judged it to be
trustworthy. In practice, the typical convention is that any policy
change must be approved by all members, i.e., stakeholders
in a legal business contract. A single member can choose to
decline and in this way prevent malicious policy changes.
TEEs such as Intel software guard extensions (SGX) are
typically vulnerable to side-channel attacks [9], [46], [18],
[70], [72]. Such attacks can be addressed using existing
techniques (e.g., Varys [57]) and are out of the scope of this
work. Similarly, we do not consider denial of service attacks.
In our threat model, we anticipate that new attacks on TEEs
can appear in the future. We assume that we can put mitigation
measures either in software or in microcode, or by limiting
execution to certain CPU types and features not vulnerable
to these attacks. This implies that we need to be able to
continuously update PALÆMON as well as the applications and
deactivate vulnerable instances within a short period of time,
so that the system is protected against new attacks.
B. Problem Statement
We now introduce a more detailed definition of the problem,
along with five challenges identified when analysing and
operating a wide range of real-world applications that we
briefly introduced earlier, with regard to our ML use case.
Secret management — Legacy software can use program
arguments, environment variables or files to obtain secrets,
as can be observed in Table I, which shows a quick analysis
of various popular services. To account for this diversity and
provide seamless integration of secret management in legacy
applications, we need to solve the problem of:
How to support secret management for common
configuration approaches in a secure way and without
requiring modifications to the source code?
Container images (e.g., Docker images) are a popular way to
deploy applications. We want to be able to customize container
images such that not only (i) different application developers
can inject different secrets in their derived application images,
but also (ii) one can inject different secrets in each container
instance of an image (see Fig. 2). For example, a client
running such an image might inject client-specific secrets for
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Table I: How popular services obtain secrets (∗: evaluated in §V).
Program Version Lang. Args. Env. Files
Consul 1.2.3 Go 7 3 3
MariaDB∗ 10.1.26 C/C++ 3 3 3
Memcached∗ 1.5.6 C 7 7 7
MongoDB 4.0 C++ 3 3 3
Nginx∗ 2.4 C 3 3 3
PostgreSQL 10.5 C 3 3 3
Redis 4.0.11 C 7 7 3
Vault∗ 0.8.1 Go 3 7 3
WordPress 4.9.x PHP 7 7 3
ZooKeeper∗ 3.4.11 Java 7 7 3
the application to be able to decrypt client-encrypted input
files. The injection mechanism must protect CIF in the sense
that an adversary cannot read, modify or replace these secrets.
Managed operation — The behaviour of applications is
not only determined by the application code, but also by its
configuration parameters such as configuration files. Some
applications could be configured in a way that can leak
confidential data. Therefore, clients would need the ability
to verify that an application is properly configured to ensure
CIF of their data. This challenge is especially critical for
PALÆMON, as it manages secrets on behalf of clients while
operating in a different administrative domain. Therefore, in
this paper, we address the problem of:
How to delegate the management of applications, as
well as PALÆMON instances, to untrusted providers while
still ensuring CIF of the secrets?
Robust root of trust — In addition to cloud providers and
system administrators, we do not trust insiders such as the
software developers who build the software components, or
the security experts who design the security policies. We must
therefore solve the problem of:
How to guarantee CIF of data and code even in face
of malicious insiders, i.e., in a Byzantine environment?
Rollback protection — Whereas cryptography can preserve
confidentiality and integrity of data via encryption, it does not
protect from the powerful class of “rollback” attacks by which
a malicious party attempts to replace the current state of the
file system with a previous version. In this way, they can revert
data and undo some processing. In our ML use case, a client
could roll back the file system to execute the application more
often than permitted. Preventing rollbacks typically implies
significant runtime overheads and application reengineering,
which we want to avoid. The problem we address is hence:
How to protect applications from rollback attacks
with only negligible overhead and without requiring
modifications to the source code?
Secure update — Software needs to be updated continuously,
not only for adding new features but more importantly to fix
bugs and patch security vulnerabilities. We therefore need a
secure approach to update applications, by making sure that
the new versions are genuine before transferring the secrets
of the previous version to the new one. Specifically:
How to update applications, as well as PALÆMON itself,
without compromising secrets even when facing a
malicious software update initiated by an insider?
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Fig. 2: Stakeholders, components and protection objectives of
PALÆMON. White on black text refers to the motivating example of
the machine learning application.
Moreover, this should be supported in settings where the
management of PALÆMON is delegated to an untrusted party
that is permitted to perform the update.
III. APPROACH: A TRUST MANAGEMENT SERVICE
Here we describe how PALÆMON tackles the introduced prob-
lems above, with more technical descriptions also given in §IV.
A. Secret Management
One of the main roles of PALÆMON is to pass secrets in
a trusted manner to applications after attesting them. Each
application is executed in a TEE and associated with a security
policy that defines which applications can access which secrets
on which hosts. Applications are identified by a cryptographic
hash of the enclave [20] (MRE) and the content of the files
they can access. Secrets are typed and can either be explicitly
defined, or randomly chosen by PALÆMON.
List 1: A Palaemon Policy Example 1
2
name: python_policy 3
services: 4
- name: python_app 5
image_name: python_image 6
command: python /app.py -o /encrypted-output 7
mrenclaves: ["$PYTHON_MRENCLAVE"] 8
platforms: ["$PLATFORM_ID"] 9
pwd: / 10
fspf_path: /fspf.pb 11
fspf_key: "$PALAEMON_FSPF_KEY" 12
fspf_tag: "$PALAEMON_FSPF_TAG" 13
images: 14
- name: python_image 15
volumes: 16
- name: encrypted_output_volume 17
path: /encrypted-output 18
volumes: 19
# an encrypted volume will 20
# be automatically generated 21
- name: encrypted_output_volume 22
# export encrypted volume to output policy 23
export: output_policy 24
25
Access to a security policy is guarded by a two-stage access
control mechanism using a certificate and a policy board (see
Fig. 3). One can define the access control and security policy
3
CC-BY 4.0. This is the author’s version of the work. The definitive version is published in the proceedings of the 50th
IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN 2020).
!
OK OK NO"Client
#
CRUD
Client cert.
$
Application arguments
Environment variables
Allowed hosts
% ! %
OK OKNO
Application
&'Tag MRE
(
Policy board
user-timesuser-check user-check
Policy
*
!# ?
Fig. 3: A policy defines which applications
can access which secrets on which hosts.
!
! Report
REST/TLS !
!
!
Accept
Policy board
user-timesuser-check user-check
!
#
Untrusted
providerIAS
Reject
PALÆMON
CA
#RC MREs…
PALÆMON
#
MRE
Cert.
/report
/report
#
Fig. 4: Managed PALÆMON supports
certificate-based attestation via PALÆMON CA.
S1
PALÆMON
Application
!
Tag
!FS
Expected tag S1
Actual tag
"
user-secret
write
S2
!
S2
$ syncclose
Update
S2
Crash Rollback
S1
!
Restart
S2
Transparent configu-
ration & attestation
Old
state
S1
!
STOP!
Time
Fig. 5: Application rollbacks are detected by
maintaining expected tags at PALÆMON.
in such a way that only applications under the control of the
security policy can gain access to the secrets. In this way, one
can prevent any stakeholder from accessing the secrets.
Secrets can be passed to applications as command line
arguments, environment variables, or can be injected into
files. The files can contain PALÆMON variables referring to the
names of secrets defined in the security policy. The variables
are transparently replaced by the value of the secret when an
application that is permitted to access the secrets reads the file.
By transparently, we mean that the application is not aware
of the replacement and its code does not need to be modified.
Secret management is supported through security policies,
whose general structure is shown in Fig. 3. An example of a
PALÆMON policy defined for a python application is presented
in List 1. Each policy has a unique name and can define:
(a) the permitted MRE (line 8) of an application (several MREs
can be specified to facilitate software updates); (b) the set
of permitted platforms (line 9) on which the application is
permitted to run, or none if permitted to run on any platform;
(c) the key (line 12) and tag (line 13) of the file system (the
tag is a secure hash across all files, which are transparently
en/decrypted with the key inside the TEE); (d) the command
line arguments (line 7); (e) the environment variables; (f) a
set of files to inject secrets into; and (g) imports/exports of
secrets from/to other policies (line 24).
B. Managed PALÆMON
Our objective is to support a feature that we can delegate the
management of a PALÆMON instance to an untrusted party, say a
cloud provider, while the clients of PALÆMON can still trust that
their secrets are safe and well protected. Note that the cloud pro-
vider has full control over what code it executes and might try
to run variants of PALÆMON that are wrongly configured or have
modified code. We ensure that clients connecting to a PALÆMON
instance can attest it, i.e., they can verify that this instance
runs the expected unmodified PALÆMON code. Moreover, this
code does not support any configuration options that negatively
influence the CIF of client data stored in the instance.
We support two ways to attest a PALÆMON instance (see
Fig. 4): (i) using transport layer security (TLS) [27], [74]; and
(ii) with explicit attestation. The TLS-based attestation requires
a trusted certification authority (CA) with a known root
certificate (RC). The CA first attests the PALÆMON instance
using approach (ii) to ensure that this instance runs inside a
TEE and has a correct MRE. Only then will the CA provide
the instance with a certificate signed with the RC. The CA
itself runs inside of a TEE and can be attested using explicit
attestation. Entities that trust the CA can attest the instance
by checking that its TLS certificate is signed by the RC.
To support software updates of PALÆMON itself, the CA
includes a set of correct MREs. The CA only signs certificates
for these MREs and also limits the duration of the certificates to
ensure timely upgrades to new versions of PALÆMON. The set
of MREs is stored inside of the CA’s binary, i.e., an adversary
cannot modify the set without invalidating the MRE of the CA.
Hence, deploying a new version of PALÆMON requires first
to deploy a new version of the CA. Updates of the CA itself
are controlled by a PALÆMON policy board consisting of a set
of stakeholders and follow the procedure described in §III-E.
Clients might not trust the CA if they do not use the current
set of valid MREs, e.g., they only trust code instances that
have been deployed some time ago, or are not represented
in the PALÆMON policy board. These clients need to attest
the PALÆMON instance in the same way that the CA attests
instances, as described in §IV-B. In practice, any updates of
PALÆMON must be approved by all stakeholders.
C. Robust Root of Trust
Our threat model permits Byzantine behaviour of
stakeholders like software developers and system administrators.
Any change to an application or its configuration can impact
the CIF of both data and code. PALÆMON therefore includes
a mechanism to ensure that any security policy modification
must be approved by at least f+1 stakeholders. To that end,
a securities policy can define a policy board and a threshold—
typically set to f+1—of policy board members that must give
approval for PALÆMON to permit any create, read, update and
delete (CRUD) access to the policy. Upon creation, the board
of the new policy must also approve the operation. In that
way, any client can create policies as long as they have unique
names, and the policy board agrees to take control over them.
Each policy board member is represented in the security
policy by a certificate and a URL of an approval service,
responsible to approve or reject accesses to the policy. Upon
a client access, PALÆMON contacts the board members, verifies
their certificates and asks them for approval of the request
via a TLS-secured REST call to their approval service.
Approval services typically run inside TEEs. In case the
associated board member is a person, they should perform
a two-factor authentication with one being based on biometric
identifiers. Approval services may also consist of services that
check certain aspects of a policy, e.g., through source code
analysis and verification of the MRE. In particular, a policy
board member could be an organisation that validates software,
i.e., perform checks on behalf of their clients to ensure that
the software associated with a certain MRE can be trusted to
protect the CIF of data.
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Some policy board members can be given veto rights, i.e.,
they can unilaterally reject a policy change. For example, a data
provider might only provide data to applications for which it is
a policy member with veto rights. In that way, the data provider
can ensure that policy changes will not result in data leakage.
D. Rollback Protection
We want to protect applications from rollback attacks
without requiring their code to be changed. To that end,
PALÆMON performs transparent encryption of files inside of
the TEE. It uses a Merkle tree to verify integrity of the files
and stores its root hash in the so-called tag of the file system.1
Any change of a file will result in a new tag, hence attempts
to modify the content of the file system or to roll back to an
older version can be detected by comparing the expected tag
with the actual tag of the file system. PALÆMON ensures that
there is no violation of integrity or freshness by verifying the
value of tag on each file system access.
In order to prevent rollback attacks, it is critical to keep
the expected tag value up-to-date. This value is kept inside
of a TEE but it is lost upon crash or when the application
terminates (see Fig. 5). Our approach is to persist the expected
tag: each time (i) a file is closed; (ii) the file system is
synchronised; (iii) or the application exits, the runtime system
pushes the expected tag to PALÆMON via the TLS connection
that was established during application startup to perform
attestation. PALÆMON stores the expected values in its database.
As these values are essential for protecting the integrity
and freshness of files, the expected tags must themselves
be protected against rollback attacks. We show in §IV how
PALÆMON efficiently protects its database against rollbacks.
A policy can also define a strict mode for an application. In
that case, PALÆMON only permits a restart of the application
if the expected tag was properly sent upon exit during the last
execution of the application. Otherwise, the restart requires
an explicit update of the policy, which is needed to adjust the
tag and must in turn be approved by the policy board.
E. Secure Update
PALÆMON protects the CIF of both code and data. The
binary code that is initially loaded in the TEE is just integrity-
and freshness-protected since we can only get secrets after
the initial attestation of the code. In contrast, all code that is
loaded after the start of the TEE is CIF-protected. For example,
an application can load dynamic libraries in main memory,
with these being transparently decrypted and CIF-protected by
PALÆMON. Code that is loaded by interpreters and just-in-time
engines is CIF-protected in the same way.
Along the same lines, PALÆMON can also perform secure
software updates of an application with the help of a policy
update. Applications are typically packaged in a container
image and data (e.g., a database) is mapped into the container
via a volume. A new version of the code results in a new MRE
and tag of the container file system. The new MRE and tag must
be updated within the security policy to permit the new version
to start, and this update must be approved by the policy board.
Consider the example of an image provider who maintains an
image that is regularly updated, for example a Python interpreter
1In reality, PALÆMON can associate an application with multiple tags to
simplify the mapping of encrypted volumes into containers.
running inside of a TEE. As software is updated, old versions
of the image should be disabled and new versions enabled. To
reduce the effort for applications that build upon this image, the
provider will create a security policy defining in our example
the MRE for the Python interpreter and a tag covering all the
dynamic and Python libraries. This information is exported, and
can then be imported by other security policies. Any application
that uses the original image can use the exported information
in its own security policy. Additionally, the application’s policy
can limit the permitted combination of MREs and tags, e.g.,
only allow combinations that were checked by an external
service. The application will only run with combinations that
are permitted by both the image’s and the application’s policies.
The advantage of computing this intersection is that, if the
image provider removes a combination that has become unsafe,
e.g., after discovering a vulnerability, the combination will be
automatically disallowed by the application’s policy as well.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe how to address some of the
challenges we faced when implementing our approach. Our
implementation is based on the SCONE platform [5] running
on top of Intel SGX [20]. However, note that PALÆMON
is designed in a generic way that can be used not only for
SCONE but also for other SGX platforms such as Graphene.
We selected SCONE since it is easy to use compared to other
platforms. To run an application with Intel SGX, we just need
to compile its source code with the SCONE compiler, or just
link the binary of the application with the SCONE libc.
We also considered ARM’s TrustZone TEE [4], but it only
supports a single secure zone rather than multiple enclaves
and it lacks an attestation protocol. Meanwhile, the current
version of AMD’s TEE, SME/SEV, lacks integrity protection
and is vulnerable to server-side rollback attacks [52], [34],
[23]. PALÆMON runs inside a TEE, i.e., inside an SGX enclave.
It is implemented in Rust [50] to ensure strong type safety.
We use an encrypted embedded SQLite [1] database running
inside the same enclave as PALÆMON. We describe below how
this database is protected against rollbacks without introducing
any major performance bottlenecks.
A. Application Attestation and Configuration
Upon startup, an application is transparently linked with the
SCONE runtime and loaded inside a TEE. The runtime first
attests the application with the help of PALÆMON before passing
control to the application. To do so, it creates a random key
pair and gets a report from a local quoting enclave [40] that
associates the public key with its MRE. The runtime sends the
report via a newly-established TLS connection to PALÆMON
and passes along the name of its security policy which is
stored in an unprotected environment variable. The PALÆMON
instance verifies that: (i) the public key of the TLS client
certificate matches the public key of the report; (ii) the security
policy name exists and the MRE is valid for the application;
and (iii) the application runs on a permitted platform—which
we can verify with the report. If this attestation succeeds,
PALÆMON sends the following data to the application: the
command line arguments; the environment variables; the keys
and tags for the file system; and the set of files in which secrets
should be injected together with the secrets as key/value pairs.
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The PALÆMON runtime supports transparent injection of
secrets into existing configuration files via a simple variable re-
placement mechanism. This allows us to inject different secrets
into different instances of the same application image, without
the need to change the source code. Like all files, they can
be CIF-protected via transparent encryption by the PALÆMON
runtime. The runtime injects the secrets it received from the
PALÆMON instance in each file as follows. The file is first read in
TEE memory, then parsed, and all variables found are replaced
by their values. Whenever the file is accessed, it is served from
memory. While sizeable files can also be stored encrypted in
main memory or on the file system, configuration files are typic-
ally small, so we keep them in TEE memory as long as they fit.
B. PALÆMON Attestation
A client of a managed PALÆMON instance must be able to
ensure that the code of PALÆMON was not modified and indeed
runs inside of a TEE. As a matter of fact, we must guarantee
that an infrastructure provider cannot configure PALÆMON in
any way that breaks the trust given by the client in PALÆMON.
We enforce this by designing PALÆMON for its behaviour to
depend solely on MRE, i.e., PALÆMON has zero configuration
parameters that affect its behaviour with regard to ensuring
the CIF of the data stored in the instance by the clients.
A client connecting to a PALÆMON instance has to attest
the instance before performing any action, such as creating
a new security policy. During the initial startup, a PALÆMON
instance creates a unique public/private key pair, as well as a
random key to encrypt its file system, and stores these keys in
sealed storage [35]. During a restart (after an exit or a failure),
the instance reads the keys from sealed storage to be able to
authenticate itself. We actually use SGX to enforce that only
PALÆMON instances on the same platform can read the sealed
file. We show in §IV-C that at most one PALÆMON instance
at a time can start up using these keys. To handle migration
issues in clouds, we can make use of existing techniques
(e.g., [30]), however, it is out of the scope of this work.
When the PALÆMON instance starts up, it attests itself
via Intel attestation service (IAS) [3], [38]. On a successful
attestation, it gets a report from IAS that associates its MRE
with its public key. The instance can send this report to
the PALÆMON CA to obtain a certificate for the public key
mentioned in the report. Clients that connect to the instance
via TLS are served this certificate after successful verification
of the certificate by the instance. The clients can then verify
the instance via TLS by ensuring that the certificate is signed
by the PALÆMON CA. Alternatively, clients can request the IAS
report via a REST API provided by PALÆMON, and then verify
that the report: (i) was indeed signed by IAS, and (ii) associates
the PALÆMON MRE with the public key of the certificate. At that
point, the clients know that the instance runs inside of a TEE
and has the correct MRE, i.e., they can now safely send requests.
Note that clients might themselves run inside a TEE and
obtain the permitted MREs from their security policy. Moreover,
they might be limited to connecting only to certain PALÆMON
instances identified by their public keys.
C. Single Instance Enforcement
Each PALÆMON instance is identified by a unique public key
that it created during initial setup. Upon restart, the instance will
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Fig. 6: Rollback protection in PALÆMON using monotonic counters.
get the same public key from sealed storage. An attacker might
try to start two or more instances with the same public key
and, in this way, may try to roll back some file system updates
of applications. Indeed, an application that stored its tag in one
PALÆMON instance might be served an old tag if it is connected
to the other instance after a restart. We prevent this attack by
ensuring, as part of the rollback protection (see below), that at
most one instance of PALÆMON runs with a given public key.
D. Protection against Rollback Attacks
We use a simple yet effective approach to protect against
rollback attacks on PALÆMON’s database. The problems that we
need to address are as follows. First, the “monotonic counters”
provided by the SGX platform [15] can be incremented no more
than 20 times per second, i.e., at most every 50 ms. This means
that waiting for a new increment of the counter can cause delays
of about 75 ms, i.e., about 25 ms on average for the current in-
crement to finish in addition to the 50 ms of the next increment.
This delay might cause unwanted delays in applications since
this limits the number of updates to the tags of a single applica-
tion to about 13 times per second, which is far too few for many
applications. Moreover, continuous increment of monotonic
counters introduces a wear and tear of the counters, leading to
a dramatically reduced life expectancy of these counters [15].
We therefore adopt an alternative approach based on the ob-
servation that PALÆMON runs on well-maintained hosts that have
very limited unscheduled downtimes. For example, there would
typically be an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) system to
reduce the likelihood of power outages. For any unscheduled
outage, we expect that we need to perform a fail-over to another
PALÆMON service instance anyhow. In our approach, illustrated
in Fig. 6, we protect against rollbacks using a version number v
stored in PALÆMON’s encrypted database and a hardware-based
monotonic counter c that keeps track of this version number.
Upon startup, PALÆMON checks that the monotonic counter c
and the version v of the database match, i.e., v=c, and oth-
erwise exits. PALÆMON then increments the monotonic counter
before accepting any request. The database is now trailing the
monotonic counter, i.e., v<c. This will prevent any further re-
starts unless PALÆMON updates v during shutdown. Furthermore,
PALÆMON checks that the increment effectively yields c=v+1.
Any higher value for c would indicate that a second
instance is already running. In such a case, PALÆMON would
exit immediately. As common for containers, PALÆMON
is terminated via a signal. In that case, it shuts down all
connections and stops accepting new requests. Existing requests
are still processed and the internal database is updated. The final
step is to increment the version in the database and shut down
the service. In this way, the monotonic counter and the version
of the database agree again, thus allowing PALÆMON to restart.
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Note that the monotonic counter c and the version v are
not incremented for every update to the expected tag (see
§III-D). Thus, our rollback protection mechanism can achieve
significantly higher throughput and lower latency compared
to previous approaches (see §V). However, in this work, we
treat a systems crash as a case of attacks, i.e., we ensure the
consistency and freshness with an assumption about availability.
Ensuring both consistency and availability is a challenging
task, which we currently address in our ongoing work.
E. Policy Access Control
Security policies can be accessed via a REST API protected
by TLS. Clients connecting to a PALÆMON instance attest the
instance by verifying that it has a certificate issued by the
PALÆMON CA. A client must also provide a client certificate,
which is stored upon creation of the security policy. All further
accesses (i.e., read, update, delete) to this policy are limited to
the clients with the same certificate, and also require approval
by the policy board. Multiple clients can easily share the same
certificate by running as part of a single security policy.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluate PALÆMON with respect to its security and its
performance. First, we introduce a security analysis. Second,
we measure the overheads both at the micro-level in controlled
environments and at the macro-level in real deployments.
A. Security Analysis
In terms of secret management, PALÆMON provides stronger
security guarantees compared to previous systems like
Barbican [58] or Vault [33]. PALÆMON protects against
eavesdropping on any communication by only supporting
TLS-based communication using ciphers with perfect forward
secrecy [31]. To avoid man-in-the-middle attacks by potentially
compromised root CAs [65], [36], we run our own PALÆMON
CA to generate the PALÆMON TLS certificates. This CA runs
inside a TEE and is controlled by a policy board to protect
against malicious software updates. Each PALÆMON instance
serves its IAS reports as a second way to be attested by its
clients. Clients are free to combine both approaches.
PALÆMON protects the CIF of data by encrypting all data
and tracking the freshness if not otherwise ensured—for all
data at rest, in transit or in main memory. This requires us
to effectively protect the secrets, such as the symmetric and/or
asymmetric keys. PALÆMON protects against unauthorized
accesses to secrets by enforcing the following: (i) secrets are
defined in the context of a security policy; (ii) each application
runs in the context of a single security policy; (iii) only
applications running in the context of a security policy are
permitted to retrieve secrets of this security policy: the security
policy specifies for each of its applications which secrets it
is permitted to access; and (iv) both the application code and
its file system state are specified in the security policy and
attested before the application can gain access to any secrets.
Access to security policies is controlled with the help
of certificates. Each client has to be authorized to access
a security policy: a client must know the private key that
corresponds to the public key used to create the security policy.
Note that no other entity, like the provider managing the
PALÆMON instance, can access this policy without knowing this
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Fig. 7: Startup times (80 kB binary) are typically not dominated by
measurement overhead as PALÆMON only measures code (left bars).
private key. Therefore, only the client that creates a security
policy controls access to this security policy. Any policy
access must additionally be authorized by its policy board to
protect against authorized but Byzantine client accesses.
PALÆMON protects the confidentiality of stored secrets by
encrypting all secrets at rest with a randomly selected key
only known to itself. By always executing inside of a TEE,
PALÆMON protects against memory analysis of a running
instance. A PALÆMON instance is protected against some types
of control of its storage backend by providing: (i) protection
against manipulation (including rollbacks), by maintaining a
Merkle tree of its files and storing this hash value in a sealed
file (protection against rollbacks is ensured with the help of
a monotonic counter); and (ii) protection of the availability
and durability of the storage backend by the use of a trusted
object storage like PESOS [43].
PALÆMON protects against attackers with superuser access
by executing securely inside a TEE. All communication, files
and data outside the TEE are always encrypted. Hence, even
users with superuser privileges cannot access or modify any
secrets. Access rules are defined and enforced per security
policy, and a security policy can only be modified when an
authorized client requests a change that must then be approved
by the policy board of the security policy.
Although side-channel attacks are out of scope of this work,
it is worth to mention that the underlying SCONE platform
can protect against L1-based side channels attacks [57] and is
hardened against Iago attacks [17]. To mitigate the various vari-
ants of Spectre [42], we can use LLVM-extensions, e.g., specu-
lative load hardening [13] that prevent exploitable speculation.
B. Micro-benchmarks
Evaluation Settings. All our experiments are executed on
a rack-based cluster of Dell PowerEdge R330 servers. Each
machine is equipped with an Intel Xeon E3-1270 v6 CPU and
64 GB of RAM. The machines are connected to a 20 Gb/s
switched network. SGX is statically configured to reserve
128 MB of RAM for the enclave page cache (EPC) [20]. We
use Ubuntu 16.04 LTS with Linux kernel v4.13.0-38. The
CPUs use the latest microcode patch level.
The underlying SCONE runtime also supports emulation
mode (EMU) to run legacy applications without any TEE
support. We use EMU during the evaluation where indicated
to highlight the performance overhead of the TEE.
Enclave Startup Times. First, we evaluate how long it takes
to start an application inside an SGX enclave. PALÆMON
automatically loads an application inside of an enclave with
the help of a modified loader. Setting up an enclave includes:
(i) adding pages to the enclave; (ii) measuring their content;
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Table II: The average throughput of measuring pages is about an
order of magnitude slower than evicting or adding pages.
Bookkeeping Eviction Measurement Addition
1,292 MB/s 1,219 MB/s 148 MB/s 2,853 MB/s
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Fig. 8: Attestation and configuration latencies: even when located
close to Intel’s IAS server, attestation with IAS takes about an order
of magnitude longer than with PALÆMON.
(iii) evicting pages if the enclave’s size exceeds the EPC; and
(iv) bookkeeping tasks such as allocating memory and copying
data. We measured the throughput of each component with
a micro-benchmark (see Table II).
On new SGX-capable CPUs, the PALÆMON runtime will
dynamically allocate heap memory, i.e., startup times are
mainly determined by the time it takes to load the code with
some minimum heap. When the runtime fails to allocate
memory, it tries to add new heap pages to the enclave. Current
CPUs support SGX enclave sizes of up to 64 GB. This limit
is expected to increase much further, i.e., we could run most
applications inside of enclaves.
To ensure the integrity of an enclave, we need to measure
all its code and initialized data segments. The internal memory
allocator is aware of the position of the contiguous enclave
memory. It will not use memory outside of the enclave, and it
overwrites requested memory with zeros, avoiding measurement
of added heap pages. For small initial enclaves—which we
expect to be common when adding heap memory dynamically—
bookkeeping and page addition times are typically the dominant
factors, despite the slow measuring speed (see Fig. 7).
Attestation and Configuration. First, we evaluate how long
it takes to attest and configure an application. The advantage
of PALÆMON over the traditional way using IAS to perform
attestation is that PALÆMON runs on the local cluster. We
measured the time it takes to perform the individual steps of
remote attestation (§IV-B). The IAS experiment ran on servers
in Europe and in Portland, OR, USA (close to IAS servers).
In the future, we will support both IAS and DCAP [64].
PALÆMON’s attestation infrastructure will stay the same, as
it attests other factors like the file system state.
Fig. 8 shows the time it takes to: (i) initialize the necessary re-
sources; (ii) send the quote to PALÆMON; (iii) wait for PALÆMON
to confirm the successful attestation; and (iv) receive the con-
figuration. The initialization phase includes key pair generation,
DNS resolution, connection establishment, and TLS handshake
with PALÆMON. Overall, the initialization time is similar for
each attestation service and is dominated by the TLS handshake.
Obtaining and sending the quote takes longer for IAS
variants for two reasons. First, performing IAS attestation
requires providing information that is embedded into the
generated quote, which adds one round trip. Second, PALÆMON
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Fig. 9: Startup latency and throughput using attestation variants.
attestation cryptography (Ed25519 [7]) is less expensive than
the one used by IAS (EPID [11]). However, the dominating
factor for IAS is the time spent waiting for the attestation.
PALÆMON has to verify the quote either by querying the
IAS or by verifying the signature and looking up the public
key of the quoting enclave [20] (QE). Overall, PALÆMON
attestation takes around 15 ms to complete, which is an order
of magnitude faster than IAS attestation which takes 280 ms
when performed from the USA, or 295 ms from Europe.
PALÆMON also decouples application startup from IAS. Our
benchmark starts multiple minimal programs in parallel to meas-
ure the startup throughput and latency. Fig. 9 depicts the latency
and throughput for different attestation variants. In the Native
case (SGX and attestation are not involved), the throughput
scales well until all eight hyper-threads are fully utilized. At this
point, the system runs around 3,700 programs every second. If
the program is compiled with SGX but without attestation (SGX
w/o), the throughput drops to about 100 executions per second.
This variant does not scale well with increasing parallelism. We
tracked down the bottleneck to the Intel SGX driver synchron-
ising EPC page (de)allocations with a single lock. Since every
enclave has to obtain EPC pages at roughly the same time, this
lock basically enforces page requests to be served sequentially.
With IAS and PALÆMON , the startup routine performs
remote attestation before executing the actual program. With
PALÆMON attestation, we quickly reach the maximal achievable
start rate of about 90 runs per second. IAS attestation needs
a considerable amount of parallelism to partially hide the
higher latency, reaching about 40 runs per second (60 parallel
instances) at 1.4 s latency.
Rollback Protection. PALÆMON protects against rollback
attacks by ensuring that the root tags of all volumes of a process
are sent to PALÆMON on each file system synchronisation,
file closing, as well as on program exits. PALÆMON stores the
tags in its encrypted database. We measure the latency of the
PALÆMON runtime reading and updating the most recent tag
in the PALÆMON service to evaluate the overhead of rollback
protection (Fig. 11 left). The update latency is roughly 6×
higher than the read latency, as the PALÆMON service database
needs to be committed to disk for updates but not for reads.
PALÆMON itself is protected against rollbacks with the help
of a monotonic counter. To that end, we use the monotonic
counters [15] provided by the SGX platform. Independent
measurements have shown that these counters allow between
4 [49] and 17 [8] increments per second. TPM-based counters
have a throughput of approximately 10 increments per second
and wear out after 300 k to 1.4 M writes [66]. The ROTE sys-
tem [49] stores the monotonic counters in memory of a group
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Fig. 10: File-based monotonic counters are 5 orders of magnitude
faster than platform counters for the same rollback protection.
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of servers, achieving a throughput of about 500 operations per
second with 4 servers in a local area network. However, the
protection of ROTE against rollbacks is considered to be less
robust than when using the platform counters. In contrast, the
anti-rollback protection offered by PALÆMON in strict mode is
as safe as the underlying monotonic counters, i.e., PALÆMON
and its applications can only be rolled back if an attacker can
roll back the monotonic counters of the platform.
We measure how fast we can increment a monotonic counter
in the following scenarios (see Fig. 10): (a) using counters
provided by the underlying platform and the Intel SGX SDK;
(b) by opening a file, incrementing the integer stored in the file,
writing back the new counter value and closing the file upon
exit, when running in native mode; (c) like (b) but running
inside SGX enclaves without encrypting the file; (d) like (c) but
encrypting the file transparently with PALÆMON; and (e) like (d)
but also updating the tags with PALÆMON by running in strict
mode, i.e., the file is protected against rollbacks. Applications
using PALÆMON often do not need to use monotonic counters
since files are rollback-protected. Still, they sometimes use
them to track for instance the number of executions.
Using the platform’s monotonic counters, we reach only 13
increments per seconds. Note also that this approach requires
applications to be rewritten in order to be protected against
replay attacks. Variant (b) shows that we can reach a much
higher throughput of 682 k increments per second when using
a simple file-based counter. When running inside of enclaves,
throughput increases as files are transparently memory-mapped
by the SCONE runtime to counter SGX overhead. When
encrypting files, PALÆMON automatically performs caching,
increasing the throughput even more. Sending the updated tag
to a PALÆMON instance only slightly reduces the throughput.
Our measurements show that applications could use a
file-based counter and achieve throughputs that are 5 orders
of magnitude higher than using the counters provided by the
platform. This approach relies on our assumption that system
crashes are considered attacks.
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Secret Injection Latency. We measure the impact of injecting
secrets in a file by an application running inside an enclave.
To that end, we read a 4 kB file in which we inject 1 and
10 secrets (Fig. 11 right). We show the latency as well as
the overhead compared to the baseline on top of each bar.
PALÆMON achieves better latencies for files with injected
secrets—even compared to the plain file baseline—because the
secrets are injected during startup and stay in enclave memory.
Secret Access Latency. PALÆMON supports the retrieval
of keys from remote PALÆMON services. We measure the
overhead of retrieving local and remote secrets, i.e., when
using PALÆMON in a decentralized fashion (Fig. 12). There
is no visible increase in latency when retrieving 1, 5, 50 and
100 keys of 32 bytes. As a matter of fact, retrieving 50 or 100
keys consistently outperforms 1 or 5 keys. However, there is
an impact if a peer service is located on a different continent
instead of the same data centre. This is mainly caused by the
time it takes to establish of a TLS connection.
Approval Service. We measure the performance of the
approval service running inside a TEE and compare it
against a native version. In both variants, we consider HTTP
connections with and without TLS to show its impact. The
approval service and the client issuing requests run on the
same rack. We show the measured throughput/latency plots for
these four combinations in Fig. 13 (left). In these experiments,
we issue approval requests at fixed rates (achieved throughput
on the horizontal axis) until the response latencies spike. We
observe that the PALÆMON runtime over TLS achieves around
210 requests per second before the reply latencies spike. We
consider these results satisfactory for our settings, where
policy updates occur at slower rates.
Next, we investigate the impact on the response latency
when the clients of the approval service are geographically
distant. We configure this experiment with five different
distances (see the horizontal axis of Fig. 13 (right)), from
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the closest (same rack) to the furthermost deployment with
intercontinental latencies. We show the average latency of
PALÆMON’s approval service response with the 95% confidence
interval. As expected, the network latencies dominate the
costs, with up to 1.36 s response time in the worst case.
C. Macro-benchmarks
Our macro-benchmarks run using real-world systems, such
as Barbican and Vault key management systems (KMSs),
the NGINX web-server, the Memcached cache system,
the MariaDB database server (a fork of MySQL), and the
ZooKeeper distributed coordination service. Software versions
used in macro-benchmarks are presented in Table I. All
these systems benefit from PALÆMON for additional security
guarantees; we evaluate its impact on performance.
Barbican. We begin by measuring the throughput/latency
ratio with different variants of Barbican (v5.0). Fig. 14 shows:
(i) native using a simple crypto plugin; (ii) PALÆMON on SGX
hardware (HW); and (iii) BarbiE [16] (Barbican using SGX
SDK v2.0 as HSM). All variants run on CPython v2.7.14.
Additionally, we perform the Barbican measurements for CPUs
with pre-Spectre (version 0x58) as well as post-Foreshadow
microcodes (0x8e). PALÆMON exhibits some overhead since
the arguments of system calls must be checked by the syscall
shield while arguments are being copied out of the enclave and
return values are copied back in. BarbiE performs better than
Barbican native due to its small trusted computing base (TCB)
and more efficient compiled code, rather than interpreted.
Finally, the observed performance drop is of approximately
30% when using the newer microcode. We attribute this to
the flushing of L1 cache on enclave exit, required to mitigate
the L1TF vulnerability, as also reported by Intel [39] and
Weichbrodt et al. [71]. BarbiE does not suffer as much since
it requires less EPC paging and has a low number of enclave
exits, in line with its number of requests per second.
Vault. We evaluate Vault (v0.8.1) compiled by gccgo in Alpine
Linux (Fig. 15). We use wrk2 [67] to retrieve secrets from
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Vault by providing it with an appropriate token. Vault requires
a heap of least 1.9 GB to start, i.e., the enclave is much larger
than the EPC, so paging takes place. Our evaluation shows for
instance that, for latencies below 1 s, PALÆMON still achieves
61% of native throughput when running in hardware, and up
to 82% when running in EMU mode.
memcached. We evaluate the impact of PALÆMON for running
TLS protected memcached [25]. In particular, PALÆMON injects
the certificates and private keys for TLS termination. We
use memtier [61] to load and stress memcached. Fig. 16
shows the measured latency and throughput of the evaluated
systems. We make a comparison between PALÆMON and native
memcached using stunnel [73] TLS connections for both
systems. With latencies smaller than 3 ms, PALÆMON achieves
59.5% and 65.3% of native throughput with hardware and
EMU mode, respectively.
NGINX. Along the same lines, we use an encrypted
NGINX [62] container image and rely on PALÆMON to:
(i) encrypt all the files; (ii) inject the certificates; and
(iii) inject private keys used by NGINX for TLS termination.
The benchmark issues GET requests on 67 kB files (nowadays’
average size of an HTML web page [41]) with the wrk2 tool
(see Fig. 17 (a)). We see that the overhead of SGX alone is
less pronounced than that of encrypting all files. Tuning the
caching done by NGINX could improve the performance when
encrypting files. There is little difference between running
in emulation mode and inside of an SGX enclave, since not
much paging is taking place.
ZooKeeper. Next, we evaluate the overhead of PALÆMON with
the ZooKeeper coordination service. We deploy a cluster of
three nodes and evaluate three ZooKeeper variants: (i) native
using stunnel [73] for TLS termination between servers;
(ii) shielded ZooKeeper running together with the JVM in
hardware mode; and (iii) EMU mode. We use the ZooKeeper
Benchmark [47] to measure read and write throughput. The
read throughput of the shielded versions is consistently better
than the native one (Fig. 17 (b)). The write throughput
(Fig. 17 (c)) exhibits better performances in native mode, as it
involves the execution of consensus [37] via TLS, resulting in
more code and system calls being executed. Our results are on
par with SecureKeeper [10], despite its use of an encryption
proxy to protect the content only.
MariaDB. We conclude our macro-benchmarks by measuring
the throughput of MariaDB configured to perform encryption
at rest [48]. We use PALÆMON to inject a generated X.509
certificate, the private key and the encryption key. We execute
the TPC-C benchmark [69] and vary the available buffer cache.
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Fig. 17: (a) Throughput/latency for GET requests on 67 kB files, in five variants of nginx. ZooKeeper: read (b) and write (c) operations.
(d) MariaDB with TPC-C benchmark (d): increasing buffer pool helps native more than EMU or hardware.
Fig. 17 (d) presents experimental results. For small buffer pool
sizes [59], i.e., <128 MB, all configurations behave similarly
since the main overhead is hardware I/O. For larger buffer
caches, EPC paging increases in hardware mode. Hence,
adding more buffer cache reduces the throughput while it
increases the throughput in emulation and native mode. A
fair comparison with the recently proposed EnclaveDB [60]
system is currently not possible since it lacks paging support
and its performance figures are only based on simulations.
VI. PRODUCTION USE CASE
Finally, we describe a deployment of PALÆMON in a real
production environment for a company offering an online
service for automatic conversion of handwritten documents
into digital data via machine learning. Typically, customers of
this company want to acquire inference results and, due to the
sensitive nature of the documents, ensure the confidentiality of
the input images. Additionally, the company wants to protect
both the inference engine (implemented in Python) and its
machine learning models.
To achieve these security goals, the company has deployed
PALÆMON as follows. First, the company relies on SCONE’s
file system shields [5] to encrypt Python code and models used
for the inference. The customers use the same mechanism to
encrypt the input images. However, the company and the cus-
tomers do not share with each other the keys and tags to decrypt
and ensure the freshness of their digital assets. Instead, they
define a dedicate security policy to define the access control
to those. Thereafter, they submit the policy to PALÆMON after
performing the attestation (see §IV-B) to ensure code integrity.
To process an image, it takes on average 323ms and 1202ms
(3.7× slowdown) with the native and the PALÆMON-enabled
version, respectively. However, the result is less than 1.5
seconds and thus considered acceptable in a production setting.
VII. RELATED WORK
Key management systems (KMSs) [58], [53], [33] provide an
integrated approach for generating, managing and distributing
cryptographic keys for devices and applications. They are at
the core of secure distributed systems and have been widely
studied. Many approaches rely on cryptographic techniques,
often embedded in secure hardware modules [56], [55].
Recent cloud computing frameworks integrate dedicated
services for key management. Barbican [58] and Vault [33]
are popular standalone KMSs. Both rely on the operating
system (OS) for security, and thus consider a weaker threat
model than PALÆMON which considers attackers with superuser
access (see §II-A). Barbican and Vault can be protected
against such attackers by running them on top of PALÆMON;
we evaluate these hardened variants in §V. Several major
cloud providers also offer managed services to create and
control encryption keys, e.g., Amazon [2], Google [29] and
Microsoft [51]. Users must trust the providers to protect their
secrets while PALÆMON can be both managed by a provider
and attested by users to establish trust in it.
While previous KMSs integrate hardware security modules
(HSMs) to provide better protection, we deem this approach
vulnerable to the adversary PALÆMON protects against. An
adversary with superuser access can eavesdrop on the HSM
to obtain secrets, or directly hijack the KMS and observe the
secrets distributed to clients.
To the best of our knowledge, while TEEs have been widely
used to secure many applications, only two systems are using
TEEs to harden a KMS against adversaries with superuser
privileges. Researchers from Intel proposed the use of SGX for
securing Barbican [16]. Along the same lines, Fortanix’ self-
defending key management service (SDKMS) [44], [6] also
uses SGX to securely generate, store and use cryptographic
keys, certificates and various types of secrets. Both approaches
essentially provide a replacement for the functionality normally
provided by HSMs by using enclaves, hence reducing costs
and providing better extensibility. Like classical HSMs, they
still need passwords or personal identification numbers (PINs)
in configuration files to authenticate clients. In contrast,
PALÆMON provides an integrated approach to free itself
from such sensitive identifiers and use the application code
itself for authentication and authorization. PALÆMON also
provides several additional features not found in other systems,
e.g., advanced governance by a policy board, secret sharing
between service instances and rollback protection.
To integrate KMSs into legacy applications without
changing their source code, systems as Vault [33] process
configuration files and environment variables using scripts
(e.g., consul-template and envconsul) before executing the
application [21]. However, since this environment is maintained
by the OS, it is thus accessible to attackers with superuser
privileges. Hence, this is not a viable solution to protect
against privileged attackers. PALÆMON provides transparency
by establishing the environment expected by the application
inside the TEE, hence never exposing its secrets to the OS.
We finally mention that secrets are sometimes stored in
configuration management services Chubby [12], Consul [32],
ZooKeeper [37] (or its SGX version SecureKeeper [10])
along with other configuration data. Note that ZooKeeper
neither encrypts data on disk nor does it protect its network
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communication. With PALÆMON, we can retrofit the necessary
features to protect ZooKeeper in a cloud context (see §V). It is
also worth mentioning that, PALÆMON has been used not only
in production, but also in several research works [68], [45].
VIII. CONCLUSION
We introduced PALÆMON, a service to manage trust in
untrusted environments with Byzantine stakeholders. Unlike in
the Byzantine Fault Tolerance [14] approach, we can enforce—
via remote attestation—that the correct application code is
executed. In this way, we do not need to deploy multiple
replicas to enforce integrity and freshness. Moreover, we also
enforce confidentiality. In order to support application updates,
the root of trust of an application is a group of stakeholders—
some of which might be Byzantine. We protect applications
with the help of TEEs: PALÆMON clients can securely create
secrets and protect access to these secrets with a security
policy, even from insiders and attackers with superuser access.
To avoid source code changes, PALÆMON passes the secrets
to applications as arguments, environment variables and by
transparently injecting these into files. Our evaluation indicates
that applications can achieve good throughput despite running
in TEEs. Throughput of our monotonic counters is 5 orders
of magnitude higher than those offered by the SGX platform.
We will make PALÆMON available to the research community.
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